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 ABSTRACT 
In this paper we investigate public support for redistribution policy schemes at the European level, 
which are at the heart of a proposal for a European Social Union. We depart from a welfare regime 
hypothesis, suggesting that current welfare state arrangements have a strong impact on public 
opinion. Given the clear differences between member states, this would suggest that reaching a 
consensus across European societies will not be a straightforward process. First, we investigate 
whether a shared European citizenship can be used as a foundation for a Social Union. We do find a 
negative relation, however, between European identity and support for redistribution at the EU level. 
Individual mechanisms of solidarity and insurance are therefore unlikely candidates as a foundation 
for reciprocity within Europe. We do find, however, a positive relation between trust in the EU 
institutions and support for redistribution at the European level. This suggests that attitudes toward 
the institutions can determine the public legitimacy of policies implemented by these institutions, as 
the institutions are being held responsible for the sustainability of the common good of a prosperous 
and cohesive European Union. A tentative conclusion therefore could be that a European Social Union 
should not be based on interpersonal solidarity, but rather on trustworthy institutions, governing a 
common good for all Europeans.  
Page 4 of 21 
 
 
CONTENTS 
 
Euroforum............................................................................................................................................................... 2 
Abstract .................................................................................................................................................................. 3 
1. Introduction .................................................................................................................................................... 5 
2. Literature ........................................................................................................................................................ 5 
3. Hypotheses ..................................................................................................................................................... 8 
4. Data ................................................................................................................................................................ 8 
5. Operationalization .......................................................................................................................................... 8 
A. Dependent variable ................................................................................................................................... 9 
B. Explanatory variables ................................................................................................................................ 9 
C. Control variables...................................................................................................................................... 10 
6. Analysis ......................................................................................................................................................... 11 
A. Descriptive analysis ................................................................................................................................. 11 
B. Explanatory analysis ................................................................................................................................ 13 
7. Discussion ..................................................................................................................................................... 17 
8. References .................................................................................................................................................... 19 
9. Appendix: Descriptive statistics used variables ............................................................................................ 21 
  
Page 5 of 21 
 
 
   
1. INTRODUCTION 
The economic and financial crisis that has hit the global economy from 2008 on has had severe 
destabilizing consequences for the European Union. On the one hand, various political parties and 
organizations questioned the legitimacy of the Union, and this wave of Euroscepticism also had a 
strong impact on the results of the elections for the European Parliament that were held in May 
2014. On the other hand, and in complete contrast to this Eurosceptic point of view, is the strongly 
emerging vision that further European integration is required (Habermas, 2011). Various pathways 
have been suggested for this further integration. First, the common currency within the Eurozone 
requires a further integration of economic, budgetary and fiscal policies (De Grauwe & Ji, 2013). 
Second, it has been argued that a stronger political integration of the European member states is 
only possible and legitimate if the notion of a common European citizenship is being strengthened 
(Fligstein, Polyakova & Sandholtz, 2012; Grimonprez, 2014; Verhaegen, Hooghe & Quintelier, 2014). 
Third, and finally, it has been suggested that a stronger European Social Union is necessary if the 
goal is to address the strong discrepancies with regard to the economic and social performance of 
the various member states of the Union (Vandenbroucke, 2013). 
In this paper, our goal is to assess the feasibility and legitimacy of such proposals for a European 
Social Union. The level of legitimacy depends on two fundamental characteristics. First, there should 
be support for redistribution as such (Dallinger, 2010). If European citizens have the idea that 
current levels of inequality are sustainable and do not pose a moral, social or economic problem, 
almost self-evidently there would be no further social support for policies of redistribution, no 
matter what level of redistribution is envisioned. Second, even if there is democratic support for 
redistribution, citizens still need to identity the European Union as the adequate level to implement 
this policy. A preference for policies of redistribution at the national, or even at the subnational 
level, might even prevent the European Union from developing into a truly European Social Union, 
as is envisioned. This second concern finds its origin in the fact that previous studies have shown 
that various forms of diversity (linguistic, ethnic or religious) might have a negative effect on the 
willingness to invest in redistribution (Dahlberg, Edmark & Lundqvist, 2012). To a large extent, 
solidarity mechanisms imply a boundary between the ‘insiders’ who are allowed access and the 
‘outsiders’ who do not received the advantages associated with the solidarity scheme. 
2. LITERATURE 
There is a huge variation both between individuals and between societies with regard to support for 
redistribution and income inequality. While some societies are inclined to accept rather high levels 
of inequality, this is not the case for others. At the state level, it has been claimed that existing 
political rules and institution determine political support for redistribution. Welfare state regimes 
create expectations and beliefs among the population that will continue to shape their preferences 
toward future policies and their attitudes toward those that are to benefit from redistribution 
efforts (Jæger, 2006). Building on the distinction between various welfare state regimes that has 
been introduced by Esping-Andersen (1990), the reasoning in this line of the literature is that 
citizens’ concepts of fairness and equality are being shaped by their institutional setting, which 
would also imply a large degree of institutionally-shaped path dependency, as this congruence 
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between welfare regimes and popular beliefs in the long run might lead to a continuation of existing 
policies (Jæger, 2009). Experiences with welfare regimes thus determine public opinion, which by 
itself functions as a barrier against change in the nature of welfare regimes and redistribution 
policies (Brooks & Manza, 2007). Especially in countries with a long tradition in welfare regimes, this 
regime hypothesis clearly explains differences in public opinion toward redistribution (Larsen, 2008; 
Jakobsen, 2011). 
On the individual level, it has been argued that support for redistribution policies to some extent 
depends on forms of enlightened self-interest and risk-aversion. Even actors who currently have high 
levels of economic resources, can still calculate the odds that at some moment in their life, they too 
will be confronted with an economic downturn, which will force them to rely on forms of social 
security and redistribution (Alesina & La Ferarra, 2005). The reverse phenomenon has also been 
documented: if those who have low levels of economic resources have the idea that they can realize 
upward social mobility based on their own merits and labour efforts, these groups are less likely to 
support forms of redistribution (Benanbou & Ok, 2001). Basically, it is argued in this approach that 
citizens follow an insurance logic: their support for policies of redistribution is partly based on their 
assessment that, at a given point in time, they too might profit from this policy. This assessment of 
course can be wrongly informed or erroneous, but this will not make a difference with regard to the 
way they formulate their preferences. Self-evidently, support for redistribution can also be based on 
feelings of solidarity or a rational insight into need for sustainable social cohesion (Van Parijs, 2000). 
In that case, the benefits that the individual will receive in the long run are far less tangible, and their 
common goods character might even lead to free rider behaviour. This does lead to the suggestion, 
however, that social integration is not necessarily based only on interpersonal solidarity, but can also 
be founded on the preference for a more cohesive society, also at the European level. 
Empirical research suggests that it will be difficult to achieve a high level of solidarity if cultural 
distances within a society are perceived to be rather large (Bay & Pedersen, 2006). These distances 
can be based on ethnicity, religion or language. This approach toward support for redistribution has 
important consequences for the scope of redistributive policies. Rational actors will have a 
preference to limit redistribution efforts to a specific in-group, with the expectation that the 
members of that in-group will practise some form of generalized reciprocity. In fact, some studies 
have shown that because of this mechanism, immigration and ethnic diversity might have a 
detrimental effect on the willingness to support redistribution policies. As it is assumed that part of 
the immigrant population will be dependent on social security benefits, the incentives for natives to 
invest in redistribution schemes are expected to be reduced (Larsen, 2011; Mau & Burkhardt, 2009). 
The willingness to support redistribution among members of out-groups is in general more limited, 
because in that case the odds that in some way or another a form of reciprocity will occur are much 
more limited (Hooghe et al., 2009). Historically it can indeed be observed that most current systems 
of redistribution found their origin within the framework of the nation-state, and this automatically 
installs a boundary with regard to who can be involved in this redistribution scheme (Banting & 
Kymlicka, 2006). As Kymlicka (2001, 226) argues:  
“there must be some sense of common identity and common membership uniting donor and 
recipient, such that sacrifices being made for anonymous others are still, in some sense, 
Page 7 of 21 
 
 
   
sacrifices for 'one of us'. Also, there must be a high level of trust that sacrifices will be 
reciprocated: i.e. that if one makes sacrifices for the needy today, that one's own needs will 
be taken care of later”.  
The expectation of reciprocity therefore is not specifically tied to an individual or a group of 
individuals but rather to a general expectation that the system as such will take care for a 
generalized reciprocity. It is therefore not necessary to expect that the specific individual that now 
receives a benefit will also compensate this by contributing oneself at a fixed time in the future. The 
principle of generalized reciprocity means that there is a reasonable expectation that, somewhere in 
the future, one will be able to rely on reciprocity, no matter who is expected to contribute for that at 
a certain moment of time. It is important to note here that this expectation of generalized 
reciprocity does not necessarily depend on an assessment of the trustworthiness of individual others 
within the exchange network. Governing institutional norms, or the impact of state institutions that 
can function as a third party enforcer, might be equally effective in this regard (Barta et al., 2011). 
While in the past national social security systems mainly played this role, it remains to be 
investigated whether institutions at different policy levels might be equally effective in this regard. 
An alternative reading to these findings is that moral norms do play an important role in the 
willingness to invest in redistribution schemes (Bowles & Gintis, 2000). In that case, too, however, 
previous research indicates that the set of norms actors use might vary considerably between 
countries, partly as a result of past experiences with currently existing social security schemes. 
The finding that there are substantive differences between countries and existing welfare state 
regimes would imply that it is not evident to change the scope of welfare regimes (Kulin & Svallfors, 
2013). Countries in Europe, and therefore also public opinion in these countries, have experiences 
with huge differences with regard to the structure of redistribution policies (Guillaud, 2013). 
Following the logic of the impact of welfare regimes on public opinion, the conclusion has to be that 
there will be a level of institutional inertia that is hard to overcome. Adding a new layer on top of 
these existing institutional structures will inevitably lead to the question what kind of framework has 
to be implemented, as clearly countries do not agree on the specific characteristics of welfare state 
regimes that should be developed. 
The regime hypothesis, however, also implies that institutions do play an important role in this 
regard. Citizens show a tendency to interiorize and support the norms that are being applied by the 
institutions that are responsible for implementing social policy. Hetherington (2005) has shown that 
support for redistribution policies in the United States does not just depend on levels of 
interpersonal solidarity, but also on trust in the political institutions that will have to implement 
redistribution policies. Even citizens who do support solidarity as an abstract principle, will be less 
inclined to spend scarce resource into redistribution, if they have the feeling that the institutions 
that have to implement these policies will do so in a responsive and effective manner. Trust in both 
national and European institutions should thus help us to explain a preference to transfer 
redistributive policies from the national to the European level. Support for redistribution can find its 
origins both in interpersonal solidarity, as in belief in the legitimacy of the institutions that will 
implement this redistribution. 
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3. HYPOTHESES 
Applying the welfare regime hypothesis to the question whether there is public support for a 
European Social Union, or more broadly for redistribution at the European level, therefore leads to a 
number of contrasting expectations. On the one hand, it can be assumed that national welfare 
regimes will continue to have an effect on public opinion in the various member countries, and these 
persistent cross-national differences will render it more difficult to achieve a European consensus on 
the way such a European redistribution scheme could be implemented. On the other hand, it can be 
expected that the willingness to support redistribution is not just dependent on identification with 
other fellow-Europeans, and we know from previous research that European identity is only weakly 
developed in most European member states (Verhaegen, Hooghe & Meeusen, 2013). The 
institutional perspective rather leads to the expectation that if citizens perceive the EU institutions 
as a viable setting for redistribution policies, they will also be inclined to support the policies that will 
be developed at that level. 
We thus expect a positive effect of European political trust on support for social redistribution on 
the EU level. Also, a negative relationship is expected between national political trust and support 
for social redistribution on the EU level as respondents with low trust in their national political 
institutions are expected to compensate for this by diverting their expectations for social 
redistribution to a different level, for instance the EU level. Respondents with high trust in national 
political institutions are not expected to divert to the EU level. Trust in the EU political institutions 
therefore is expected to be a stronger predictor for redistribution policies at the European level than 
the feeling of a European identity. 
4. DATA 
The data used in this study are derived from a recent survey wave of Eurobarometer: Eurobarometer 
75.3 (2011). This specific dataset is selected as it includes the necessary information to test the 
factors driving support for social redistribution on the European level. Eurobarometer 75.3 contains 
data on all 27 EU member states the EU consisted of in 2011. About 1,000 respondents were 
interviewed in May 2011 in each member state. A total of 26,713 respondents are included in the 
dataset. Respondents were selected using a multi-stage random probability sample and were face-
to-face interviewed. By using multilevel analyses, we take the structure of the data into account 
(individuals are nested in member states) and we can control for country level indicators which 
could explain differences in preferences for or against social redistribution at the EU level, as 
expected by the regime hypothesis. Additional information to construct the country level variables is 
collected from Eurostat (GDP per capita and national social expenditures). 
5. OPERATIONALIZATION 
In this section the used variables are presented. We explain why they are included in the analysis 
and how they are measured. Descriptive statistics for all variables can be found in Appendix I. 
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A. DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Support for redistribution on the EU level is the dependent variable in our study. This is measured in 
Eurobarometer 75.3 with the question: “On which of the following would you like the EU budget to 
be spent?”. Respondents were asked on what the EU budget should be spent firstly and secondly. 
One of the response options was ‘Social affairs and employment’, which are typical examples of 
social policy. We coded the dependent variable into three categories: social affairs and employment 
not mentioned (code 0), social affairs and employment mentioned secondly (code 1) and social 
affairs and employment mentioned firstly (code 2). The higher the score, the more support the 
respondent has for social redistribution on the EU level. As there are only three points on this scale, 
but as they can be ordered from weak to strong support for social redistribution, we will use ordered 
logistic multilevel analyses. 
B. EXPLANATORY VARIABLES  
To test the relationship between self-interest (the insurance logic) and support for social 
distribution, we include the perceived financial situation of the respondent. This is measured by the 
perception of the current economic situation of the household of the respondent. Responses range 
on a 4-point Likert scale. Respondents were asked: “How would you judge the current situation in 
each of the following? The financial situation of your household”. Responses range from ‘very bad’ 
(code 1) to ‘very good’ (code 4). A measure for perceived financial situation of the household is used 
as previous research has shown that perceptions one’s financial situation are a better explanation 
for the attitudes of citizens than measures of the actual financial situation of an individual (Hooghe 
& Marks, 2005; Loveless & Rohrschneider, 2011). According to the insurance logic, citizens base their 
preferences for social redistribution on an assessment of their own financial situation. The more 
positive they perceive their own financial situation, the less if favour they are of social redistribution. 
However, this assessment might be erroneous, so we use a measure of perceived financial situation 
to take this inconsistency into account. 
The theory of self-interest, however, also leaves room for solidarity, as explained in the theoretical 
section. Yet, an important restriction to this solidarity is the expectation that it is limited to the in-
group. It is thus expected that citizens who have a stronger feeling of a ‘European in-group’ will be 
more in favour of social redistribution on the EU level. In other words, citizens with a stronger 
European identity are expected to be more supportive of European social redistribution. Strength of 
European identity is in Eurobarometer 75.3 measured with the following survey item: “For each of 
the following statements, please tell me to what extent it corresponds or not to your own opinion. 
You feel you are a citizen of the EU”. The response options to this question ranged on a 4-point 
Likert scale ranging from ‘no, definitely not’ (code 1) to ‘yes, definitely’ (code 4). 
In contrast to the hypothesis that support for redistribution depends on whether it is organized for 
the in-group identified with, is the idea that citizens’ trust in the institutions who organize this 
redistribution is crucial. Accordingly, a measurement is included for both national and European 
political trust as citizens are expected to more easily accept social redistribution when they trust the 
institutions that organize this redistribution. A positive effect of European political trust on support 
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for social redistribution on the EU level is expected. Also, a negative relationship is expected 
between national political trust and support for social redistribution on the EU level as respondents 
with low trust in their national political institutions are expected to compensate for this by diverting 
their expectations for social redistribution to a different level, for instance the EU level. Respondents 
with high trust in national political institutions are not expected to divert to the EU level. 
The welfare regime hypothesis assumes that the context in which an individual operates drives the 
strength of support for social redistribution. It is expected that citizens adapt their preferences to 
the social welfare regime that is already applied. While social welfare is still mainly a national 
competence, members of the Eurozone are already more strongly economically and financially 
integrated. We therefore expect that there will be broader public support for social redistribution – 
a form of financial integration – in these member states. A dummy distinguishing between Eurozone 
and non-Eurozone members is thus include in the analysis. 
C. CONTROL VARIABLES 
We included control variables on both the individual level and on the country level. On the individual 
level controls are included for ideological orientation, citizenship status, optimism about the future 
of the EU and a number of socio-demographic variables (educational level, age and gender). On the 
country level the analysis contains controls for the national social expenditures and for being part of 
the ‘PIIGS’-group.  
We control for ideological orientation because citizens might be in favour of social redistribution in 
general, as an ideological choice, rather than because of self-interest. We expect citizens who place 
themselves more left on the socio-economic left-right scale to be more supportive of redistribution 
on the EU level. This is measured on a 12-point scale in Eurobarometer 75.3. The higher the score on 
this scale, the more left the respondents place themselves. 
We control for citizenship status as this is expected to be related with European identity, so with the 
feeling to be part of the in-group (Agirdag, Huyst & Van Houtte, 2012). The data allow us to 
distinguish between natives and non-nationals, based on the nationality respondents have. 
Optimism about the future of the EU is included in the analysis as controlling for it allows us to see 
the effect of having the specific attitude of having more or less trust in the EU institutions, regardless 
of a generally positive (or negative) attitude about the EU. Also, we expect that optimism about the 
future of the EU will be negatively related to support for social redistribution on the EU level, as 
optimist citizens might think that budgetary investments in social affairs and employment are not 
needed. 
Educational level was measured by asking respondents when they ended their full time education. 
Based on this information categories were constructed indicating whether the respondent ended 
his/her full time education before the age of 15, between the age of 16 and 19 years old, after the 
age of 20, whether the respondent is still a student or whether the respondent never had full time 
education. As the most common category is to study until 16 to 19 years old (43 per cent of the 
respondents studied until this age), this category is selected as the reference category. 
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As a control for the welfare regime theory, the social expenditures which are already taking place in 
each member state are taken into account. In member states with high social expenditures 
respondents might be less in favour of EU social redistribution because they have internalized the 
idea that social redistribution is organized in a well-developed way on the country level. The social 
expenditures are calculated in purchasing power standards per capita in 2011 (Eurostat, 2014). 
Finally, as the survey took place during the euro crisis, we included a dummy variable on the country 
level that distinguishes between the member states that were most severely struck by this crisis 
(also known as the ‘PIIGS’-countries). Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain were therefore 
attributed code 1, the other member states were attributed code 0. We expect that citizens in 
countries facing economic problems will be more in favour of redistribution on the EU level because 
this would most likely mean that they would receive funding. Supporting EU level redistribution 
would thus be favoured because of self-interest at the national level. 
6. ANALYSIS 
A. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
Before we investigate support for social redistribution on the EU level, it is useful to have a look at 
the absolute figures. At the EU level, respondents were asked to choose two policy domains from a 
list of 16 options on which they think the EU should spend its budget. As this is a very broad list of 
choices, it is quite remarkable that half of the respondents picked social affairs and employment as 
either the first or the second choice (see Figure 1). This topic is even the most popular one among 
respondents compared to all other options. Both for their first and second choice about what the EU 
budget should be spent on, the highest proportion of respondents chose social affairs and 
employment. 
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Figure 1. Distribution support for social redistribution on the EU level 
 
Source: Eurobarometer 75.3 
Figure 2 shows that significant country differences exist in support for social redistribution on the EU 
level. The strongest support can be found in Slovenia, Bulgaria and Spain; the weakest support is 
found in the UK. It has to be noted that we find high levels of support for European social 
redistribution in countries with a high level of income inequality, which would lead to the conclusion 
that in countries with a more egalitarian income structure, inhabitants are less likely to feel a 
pressing need to further reduce this inequality. Additionally, not only the clustered sampling of the 
respondents, but the accordingly clustered levels of support for European social redistribution as 
well show that it is important to take the multilevel structure of the data into account.  
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Figure 2. Support for social redistribution on the EU level, by country 
  
Source: Eurobarometer 75.3 
B. EXPLANATORY ANALYSIS 
Following this presentation of the absolute levels of support for European social redistribution in 
each member state, multivariate multilevel analyses are carried out in order to test which factors 
can explain different levels in support for social redistribution on the EU level.  
The models presented in Table 1 are proportional odds models, assuming that each category of the 
dependent variable has a different intercept (the thresholds in Table 1), but that the effect of each 
independent variable (the regression coefficient) is the same for every category. As the model is a 
cumulative ordered regression model, the odds ratios indicate the odds that a respondent is found 
in the highest category of support for European social redistribution, compared to being in a lower 
category. 
As can be seen from the null model (Table 1), there is 6.3 per cent of variance between member 
states in support for social redistribution. This indicates that 6.3 per cent of the difference in support 
for European social redistribution can be attributed to country-specific factors. While we can 
distinguish significantly different levels of support for European social redistribution between 
member states (Figure 2), the variance indicates that this difference is rather limited. This should not 
come as a surprise, however, because in this analysis, all opinions refer to exactly the same 
European institutions. This obviously has an effect on the homogeneity of answers within Europe. 
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In Model II, the relationship between the explanatory variables and support for European social 
redistribution is presented. First, we find support for the idea that preferences about social 
redistribution are driven by self-interest: respondents that have a more positive perception of the 
financial situation of their household are significantly less supportive of European social 
redistribution (B= -0.086, odds ratio = 0.918, p<0.001). For a one unit increase in perceived financial 
situation of the household, the odds of the highest category of support for European social 
redistribution versus the lower categories are 0.082 times smaller, given that the other variables in 
the model are held constant. Because of the proportional odds assumption, the same decrease 
(0.082 times) is found between the middle category and the lowest category of support for 
European social redistribution. This confirms previous findings that especially those who stand to 
gain from redistribution schemes will be in favour of their implementation, while the reverse holds 
for actors that are less likely to ever benefit themselves of redistribution schemes. We find opposite 
results, however, for the hypothesis that citizens are more easily willing to accept social 
redistribution within the in-group, as we find a significantly negative coefficient for European 
identity. Respondents who identify more strongly with the European Union are in effect less likely to 
support redistribution at the European level. These findings (which remain stable when the control 
variables are included in Model III) hint at the conclusion that support for a European Social Union 
could not be based on interpersonal solidarity. Even among those who identify as Europeans, there 
is apparently little willingness to support redistribution towards fellow European citizens. More 
specifically, in Model II, for a one unit increase in European identity, the odds that the respondent is 
in the highest category of support for European social redistribution versus a lower category of 
support is 0.068 times smaller, given that the other variables in the model are held constant.  
Second, we find a significantly negative relationship between trust in national political institutions 
and support for European social redistribution. When a respondent trusts the national political 
institutions, the odds are 0.063 times smaller (in Model III) to be in the highest category of support 
for European social redistribution than to be in a lower category. This is in line with the expectation 
that citizens rather look at political institutions for the organization of social redistribution, than at 
individual fellow citizens. Put differently, citizens who do not trust their national institutions much 
tend to divert their expectations to the European level. This can also be seen in the relationship 
between trust in European political institutions and support for redistribution on the EU level. After 
including the controls in Model III2, this relationship is significantly positive, which confirms the 
expectation that respondents who trust the EU institutions to function in an appropriate manner are 
also more likely to invest in this level and are willing to pass new competences to it. When a 
                                                                
 
2 This analysis clearly shows that it is important to include the necessary controls in the analysis. In Model II we 
did not find a significant relationship for European political trust as the control for optimism about the future 
of the EU was not included yet. Optimism in the future of the EU is a covariate which is positively correlated 
with European political trust, but negatively correlated with support for European social redistribution. The 
relationship between European political trust and support for European social redistribution is thus 
mitigated by this covariate. By controlling for optimism about the future of the EU, the relationship between 
European political trust and support for European social redistribution gets clearer. 
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respondent trusts the EU institutions, the odds of the highest category of support for European 
social redistribution versus the lower categories are 1.100 times greater.  
Third, the significantly positive relationship in Model III (B=0.245, p<0.001) between being a member 
of the Eurozone and supporting social redistribution on the EU level hints at the welfare regime 
hypothesis to be useful when studying the European integration project. Eurozone members are 
more strongly integrated in the EU in a financial way. As spending the EU-budget on social issues is a 
matter of financial integration as well, we indeed expected that citizens in Eurozone member states 
would be more supportive of social redistribution within the EU. This is shown in the results by the 
odds that are 1.278 times greater to be in the highest category of support for European social 
redistribution versus the lower categories for a respondent that lives in a Eurozone country. It thus 
makes a substantive difference whether the respondent lives inside or outside the Eurozone. 
Finally, for the control variables, we find that respondents who are more optimistic about the future 
of the EU are significantly less supportive of European social redistribution. They might not find it 
necessary to invest in this policy area because they expect things to turn out well anyway. Likewise, 
a negative effect is found from the current level of national social expenditures. Support for ‘further’ 
social redistribution, therefore, seems to be depending partly on the current level of social 
expenditures. Leftist and female respondents, to the contrary, are more supportive of social 
redistribution on the EU level. No significant correlation is found for living in a ‘PIIGS’ country. 
Respondents that live in on of the EU member states that are most severely hit by the euro crisis are 
not more likely to be in favour of social redistribution.  
Page 16 of 21 
 
 
Table 1. Modelling support for social redistribution on the EU level  
 Model I 
Null model 
Model II 
Support for European 
social redistribution 
Model III 
Model with controls 
  B Odds 
ratio 
B Odds 
ratio 
Individual mechanisms of 
solidarity and insurance 
     
Perceived financial situation 
household 
 -0.086*** 0.918 -0.061** 0.941 
European identity  -0.070*** 0.932 -0.040* 0.961 
National political trust  -0.095** 0.909 -0.065* 0.937 
EU political trust  0.037 1.038 0.095** 1.100 
Welfare regime hypothesis      
Eurozone member  0.129** 1.138 0.245*** 1.278 
Individual level control variables      
Optimism future EU    -0.121*** 0.886 
Left ideology    0.017*** 1.017 
Citizenship status (native is ref.)      
Non-national    0.033 1.034 
 
Age    -0.002** 1.000 
Gender (male is ref.)    0.160*** 1.174 
 
Education (ref. is studied until 16 
to 19 years old) 
     
Until 15 years old    0.015 1.015 
Over 20 years old    -0.002 0.998 
Still in education    -0.346*** 0.708 
No full time education    0.144 1.155 
Country level control variables      
National social expenditures    -0.005*** 0.995 
PIIGS country    -0.061 0.941 
      
Treshold    
Intercept 1 0.040 -0.331*** -0.557*** 
Intercept 2 0.874*** 0.506*** 0.283* 
Log likelihood -21303.237 -21263.216 -21202.242 
Variance (country level) 0.063** 0.054** 0.072** 
Source: Eurobarometer 75.3 (2011). 
Notes: Regression coefficients and odds ratios of cumulative ordered logistic multilevel regression 
analyses using GLLAMM are presented. N(individual level)= 21,223. N(country level)=27. 
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05. Bivariate correlation tests and VIF statistics indicated that there are 
no problems of multicollinearity. 
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7. DISCUSSION 
The goal of the current study was to investigate the determinants of support for redistribution 
policies at the EU level. In this regard, we mainly followed an institutional logic, leading to the 
assumption that the way in which these redistribution policies are organized, also has a strong 
impact on public opinion.  
In this study, we do not wish to argue about the incentives actors receive to invest resources in 
social protection across Europe. Indeed, Vandenbroucke and Vanhercke (2014, 51) claim that an 
important incentive might be that a stronger European Social Union is a prerequisite to ensure the 
long-term stability of the entire Eurozone, which will have a positive effect on the economic 
development levels of all citizens of the Eurozone. It has to be observed, however, that this 
reciprocity mechanism does not operate at the individual level, but on the aggregate level. For the 
inhabitant of one of the richer EU member states the incentive to invest is not the hypothetical 
possibility that, one day, an inhabitant of the poorer EU countries will pay for her/his pension or 
social security scheme. The odds that such an event will occur in the foreseeable future are indeed 
very limited, given the strong economic divergences between the member states. Rather, the insight 
has to be that the state of the economy of the richer EU member states too will be affected by an 
economic downturn in one of the poorer EU states. In that case, a European social union is not 
founded on interpersonal solidarity or reciprocity, but rather on a realization of the high level of 
interdependency between European economies. 
At first sight, such an aggregate reciprocity mechanism might seem an unlikely foundation for a 
program for more social redistribution within Europe. Such a foundation might seem rather abstract, 
for citizens who are not familiar with economic policies, European rules and basic knowledge about 
economic cycles. But on the other hand, the entire literature on regime effects on support for 
redistribution is equally abstract. This literature suggest that willingness to invest in social security 
schemes on a national level, is not dependent on an assessment of the morality of individual 
recipients of social security efforts. From an institutionalist perspective, it can be argued that this 
support is based on an expectation about how the institutions will behave in the future, and what 
are the benefits the actor will receive from these institutions and the policies they embody (Brooks 
& Manza, 2007). In a similar vain, on a European level too, these institutions might have a similar 
effect. If European citizens are convinced that the European political, monetary and social 
framework has tangible benefits for their own level of well-being, gradually support might develop 
to add a stronger social dimension to the European institutional framework. An advantage of such a 
scheme is also that it does not responds to a zero-sum logic. Placing the emphasis on social 
exchange between the richer and the poorer EU member states inevitably means that every euro 
that is transferred from rich to poor, is lost for those rich countries, while the odds are rather small 
that the transfer will be reversed in the near future. Developing a European social architecture, 
however, implies that this jumping scales has beneficiary effects on all European economies, and this 
leads to the development of a win-win situation. Framed this way, inhabitants of the rich EU 
member states no longer should have the feeling that they are asked to make a ‘sacrifice’ for the 
poorer EU countries. 
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Vandenbroucke and Vanhercke (2014, 61) note that a stronger social dimension of the European 
Union can be based both on solidarity and mutual insurance, and most likely “a mixture of both”. 
The solidarity mechanism “implies a propensity to cooperate and share with others similarly 
disposed, even at personal cost”. The current analysis suggests that this interpersonal solidarity 
mechanism currently is only weakly developed within Europe. Not only is the sense of a European 
identity not all that wide-spread, but we have even seen that identifying as a European might have a 
negative impact on the willingness to support redistribution at the European level. To put it 
differently: it would be wrong to expect that if Europeans gradually identify to a larger extent as 
European, this will automatically lead to the establishment of interpersonal ties of solidarity across 
the European continent. 
This does not imply, however, that the proposal for a European Social Union as such should be 
dismissed. It does imply that the insurance element of the proposal, especially at the aggregate 
level, will need to be emphasized in order to strengthen the public legitimacy of this proposal. From 
a functionalist perspective, this is a likely development. The European monetary union is a well-
established fact, and its functioning and stability could and should have an effect on public opinion 
that is more than eager to preserve the economic benefits of this governance scheme. In a way this 
reverses the policy logic. To some extent, there indeed has to be a shared concept of European 
citizenship and group identity in order to achieve a European Social Union. But trust in the 
institutions of the European Union in this regard is most likely more important. If citizens have the 
conviction that the EU institutions function in an effective and trustworthy manner, this does 
increase their willingness to transfer new policy domains to these European institutions. From an 
institutionalist perspective, we can argue that what matters most is trust in the institutions, and to a 
lesser extent, trust in each and every one of one’s fellow citizens.  
This logic implies that a European Social Union should not just be seen as an individual mechanism of 
solidarity. If we focus on individuals, the insurance element is rendered very unlikely. Redistribution 
implies that resources will be transferred from the archetypical Swedish dentist to the retired Greek 
worker. The likelihood that this individual solidarity will ever be reversed is almost zero, given the 
huge differences with regard to economic development levels within the EU. The focus therefore has 
to be at the aggregate and institutional level. A more prosperous and cohesive European Union has 
important economic benefits, also for our Swedish dentist. Defined in this manner, a European Social 
Union can be conceptualized as a common good, with benefits flowing to all members, whether or 
not they as an individual receive resources from the system. As such, we can relate to a long line of 
studies on the sustainability of common goods (Ostrom, 2005). Governing the commons does not 
require a high level of trust in each and every individual that might benefit from joining these 
common pools of resources. But it does require a high level of trust in the effectiveness of the 
institutions that will govern these commons and this is most likely the main challenge for the 
European institutions as they currently function. The European institutions have been faced with an 
enormous challenge in their struggle to uphold the levels of prosperity of European citizens. These 
efforts have not always been successful, and this has further eroded the legitimacy of the European 
Union, as became apparent during the European elections of May 2014. But simultaneously the EU 
needs higher levels of legitimacy, if it wants to play its role and protect the European social model. 
The long-term answer to the prevailing climate of Euroscepticism is not less Europe, but more and 
more effective Europe.  
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9. APPENDIX: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS USED VARIABLES 
 
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum 
Perceived financial situation household 2.630 1 4 
National political trust 0.378 0 1 
EU political trust 0.520 0 1 
European identity 2.742 1 4 
Optimism future EU 2.621 1 4 
Age 48.534 15 98 
Left ideology 6.347 1 12 
National social expenditures (per capita in 
PPS) 
6306 1602 13275 
 Proportion   
Support for social redistribution on the 
EU level 
   
No support 49.55%   
Secondly 18.64%   
Firstly 27.69%   
Gender    
Male 45.96%   
Female 54.04%   
Citizenship status    
Native 97.72%   
Non-national  2.28%   
Education  
Until 15 years old 17.59% 
Until 16 to 19 years old 43.52% 
Over 20 years old 30.57% 
Still in education  7.90% 
No full time education  0.41% 
Eurozone member 60.85% is member 
PIIGS country 19.14% is member 
Source: Eurobarometer 75.3 (2011). 
 
 
 
 
